Often referred to as the ultimate act of terror, bioviolence employs the hostile use of diseases such as smallpox, botulism or Ebola to inflict fear and destruction, perhaps on a global scale. In his latest book, “BIOVIOLENCE: Preventing Biological Terror and Crime” (Cambridge University Press, 2007), DePaul University College of Law Professor Barry Kellman takes a sobering look at the dangers that arise when biology is used to create weapons of terror.

An internationally recognized expert on bioterrorism and weapons of mass destruction, Kellman, who also heads DePaul’s International Weapons Control Center, has spent seven years traveling across five continents and participating in hundreds of discussions to measure the threat biological weapons pose and how prepared nations are to prevent those threats from becoming a reality. He initiated, and is special advisor to, the Interpol Program on the Prevention of Bio-Crimes and he has served as legal adviser to the National Commission on Terrorism, which was responsible for one of the most comprehensive reviews of American security.

“The central reality of bioviolence is that it an immense threat, but a massive catastrophe has yet to happen,” said Kellman. “Truth is, we are likely to take appropriate steps to prevent a second bioattack, but we seem fated to suffer the wounds of one disease disaster before the threat becomes real enough to embrace complex policies to thwart future attacks.”

Both alarming and optimistic, Kellman skillfully explains how bioviolence threatens the entire global community. His book discusses strategies to prevent these threats—strategies that are grounded in international law. Some of the specific points raised in “BIOVIOLENCE” include:

o Biological weapons tend to be anonymous. The primary motivation for committing bioviolence is to create panic. No other weapon offers a comparable capacity to inflict catastrophe anonymously.

o The delayed effects of bioviolence could enable a sophisticated bio-offender to wage a strategic series of attacks. As the toll of sick victims multiplies in one place, he can move to another location.

o Attacks with different agents could radically compound the challenges for containing consequences. For example, one of the great fears associated with anthrax is that it might be used to “cover” a contagious outbreak of another disease, the delayed effects of which might be initially ignored in the face of hundreds or thousands of anthrax causalities.

o Bio-agents are easy to disseminate. Contagious agents can escalate panic in people living thousands of miles away from the bio-attack. This makes it extremely difficult for law enforcement to gain control over the situation.

o Vaccines for many diseases have been stockpiled, but by the time the disease-causing agent can be identified and the proper vaccine disseminated, thousands could fall victim to the attack.

o No central agency exists to track and police bioagents worldwide. While nuclear materials can be readily traced, the location of many biological agents are not tracked, and no measures are in place to ensure the security of refined agents in laboratories.

o International laws designed to curtail the threat of bioviolence have been slow to develop. This is especially a problem because effective prevention requires the ability to predict threats 10 to 15 years ahead.

To reduce biothreats, Kellman suggests enhancing capabilities for threat assessment as well as attack prevention, detection and response. He also advocates that nations must work together to face the threat of bioviolence.

“The analytical challenges associated with preventing bioviolence are difficult to resolve,” said Kellman. “At the heart of this difficulty is how to grapple with a problem that necessarily demands humanity-wide cooperation in the context of fragmented and anarchic political systems.”

Note to Editors: Barry Kellman can be reached at 312/362-5258.